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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






BILLY BALISAGE, a/k/a Billie Geam, a/k/a Jackson Peterson, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A041-487-301) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 25, 2019 
Before:  MCKEE, COWEN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 









* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





 Billy Balisage, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of a decision of the Board 
of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s order to remove 
him from the United States.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
Balisage is a native and citizen of Haiti who was admitted to the United States in 
1989.  In 1998, Balisage pleaded guilty in New Jersey state court to possession with 
intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann.  
§ 2C:35-5(a)(1) and § 2C:35-5(b)(3).  In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security 
issued a notice to appear charging that Balisage was subject to removal because he had 
been convicted of an aggravated felony – illicit trafficking in a controlled substance – and 
of violating a law relating to a controlled substance.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).   
An Immigration Judge sustained the charges of removability and denied 
Balisage’s applications for relief from removal.  On appeal, the BIA ruled that Balisage is 
removable and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility.  This petition for review 
followed.1 
 
1The BIA also rejected Balisage’s argument that he was denied due process and stated 
that he had not established his eligibility for relief from removal.  Balisage does not 
challenge these rulings and we do not consider them.  In addition, the BIA ruled that 
Balisage was not convicted of an aggravated felony under the “illicit trafficking” route 




We have jurisdiction to review a final removal order pursuant to 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252(d).  Our jurisdiction is limited to constitutional claims and question of law  
because Balisage was found removable for having been convicted of an aggravated 
felony and a controlled substance violation.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C),(D).  Our standard  
of review is de novo.  Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 906 F.3d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 2018). 
The Government has moved to dismiss the petition for review on the ground that 
Balisage has not raised a colorable constitutional claim or legal question in his Informal 
Brief.  Balisage asserts therein that he has proceedings pending in state court, but, to the 
extent he is challenging his conviction, a conviction is final for immigration purposes 
once direct appellate review has been exhausted or waived, Orabi v. Att’y Gen., 738 F.3d 
535, 543 (3d Cir. 2014), and Balisage’s conviction became final long ago.  While we 
agree that this assertion does not raise a colorable question, Balisage filed a Brief in 
Support of Appeal shortly after the Government filed its motion to dismiss raising legal 
arguments that he had raised in an earlier motion to stay his removal.  We conclude that 
we have jurisdiction to review these arguments and deny the motion to dismiss.  
Balisage first contends that he is not removable as an aggravated felon or for 
having been convicted of a violation of a law relating to a controlled substance because 
the drugs encompassed in his state statute of conviction are different than the federally 
controlled substances incorporated in the statutory removal provisions.  He states that he 




leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, and any salt, 
compound, derivative, or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical 
with any of these substances, or analogs, . . .,” see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(b)(1),(3), 
and that ioflupane, a derivative of coca leaves, was removed from the schedules of the 
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq., in 2015.  Balisage argues that, 
because his statute of conviction encompasses a non-federally controlled substance, he is 
not removable under the categorical approach to determining whether an offense 
constitutes a ground for removal. 
Balisage’s argument is foreclosed by Martinez, 906 F.3d at 287, which addressed 
the same argument and held that the drug schedules must be compared at the time of the 
conviction.2  As Balisage recognizes, federal law did not exempt ioflupane when he was 
convicted.  Although the BIA rejected Balisage’s argument for another reason, the same 
was true in Martinez and we held that we could uphold the BIA’s decision on this basis.  
We explained that the BIA’s reasoning was terse and hard to follow, but that it had cited 
Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015), the case that provides that the date of 
conviction is controlling, and thereby signaled that it looked to the date of conviction.  Id.  
The same is true here.       
Balisage also argues that his conviction for possession with intent to distribute a 
 
2This case was stayed pending a decision in Martinez.  The parties had the opportunity to 





controlled dangerous substance under § 2C:35-5(a)(1) is not an aggravated felony 
because the state statute does not necessarily proscribe conduct that is an offense under  
the Controlled Substances Act.3  He contends that, while “distribute” includes attempted  
distribution and criminal attempt requires a “substantial step” towards the commission of 
a crime under both New Jersey and federal law, these laws differ as to what conduct 
constitutes a “substantial step.”  Balisage argues that New Jersey and federal law treat 
preparation for, and solicitation of, a crime differently.  We rejected these same 
arguments in Martinez and held that New Jersey attempt law is no broader than federal 
law.  Martinez, 906 F.3d at 284-87.4   
Finally, Balisage asserts that he is eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(h).  The BIA rejected this argument because § 1182(h) allows a waiver 
where a controlled substance offense relates to a single offense of possession of 30 grams 
or less of marijuana and that is not the case here.  Balisage does not address the BIA’s 
rationale and has not shown that the BIA erred.    
  Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
 
3Both the New Jersey and the federal statute make it unlawful to manufacture, distribute 
or dispense, or to possess with the intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a 
controlled substance.  See N.J. Stat Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 
4Balisage raised these arguments on appeal to the BIA, but the BIA did not address them.  
Although a remand to an agency is generally required for a decision of a matter that a 
statute places primarily in the agency’s hands, I.N.S. v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002), 
our decision in Martinez controls the legal question presented here. 
